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Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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Print a proper error description instead of just an error code.
If the error is ERROR_FILE_EXISTS, print out a hint that this might
be caused by a case in-sensitivity issue.
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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Test against various invariants:
- Every non-root node must have a name
- The root node muts not have a name
- The name must not be ".." or "."
- The name must not contain '/'
- The loop that chases parent pointers must terminate, i.e. we must
never reach the starting state again (link loop).
Furthermore, make sure the sum of all path components plus separators
does not overflow.
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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On systems like Windows, the dynamic library and applications can
easily end up being linked against different runtime libraries, so
applications cannot be expected to be able to free() any malloc'd
pointer that the library returns.
This commit adds an sqfs_free function so the application can pass
pointers back to the library to call the correct free() implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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Behave the same way as the POSIX port and do not treat
that as an error.
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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Until now, when packing or unpacking a SquashFS image, files where
created with paranoid permissions (i.e. 0600). The rational behind
this was that otherwise, the tools may inadvertently expose secrets,
e.g. if a root user packs files that that aren't world readable,
such as the /etc/shadows file, but the packed SquashFS image is, we
have accidentally leaked this file to other users that can access
the newly created SquashFS image. The same line of reasoning also
applies when unpacking files.
Unfortunately, this breaks a list of other, more common standard use
cases (e.g. a build server where the an image is built by a deamon
running as user X but then has to be accessed by another deamon
running as Y).
This commit changes to a more standard approach of using permissive
file permissions by default and asking paranoid users to simply use
a paranoid umask.
For tar2sqfs & gensquashfs this simply means chaning the default
permissions in the libsquashfs file implementation.
For rdsquashfs on the other hand there is still the use case where
the unpacked files get the permissions from the [secret] image, so
setting a strict umask is not applicable and changing to permissive
file mode leaks something. For this case a second code path needs to
be added that derives the permissions from the ones in the image.
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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Instead of having the binary programs in randomly named subdirectories,
move all of them to a "bin" subdirectory, similar to the utility
libraries that have subdirectories within "lib" and give the
subdirectories the propper names (e.g. have gensquashfs source in a
directory *actually* named "gensquashfs").
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
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